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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arises out ofplaintiffs' attempts to punish a man for doing a charitable act 
for his neighbor. Defendant Dustin M. Kukla had been hired to bale straw for a neighboring 
farming family, the Scholls. Mr. Kukla was planning to borrow his grandfather's baler, but was 
ultimately unable to borrow that baler. In July of 2003, Mr. Kukla approached Defendant Darrell 
L. Robertson who had a tractor and baler. Mr. Robertson told Mr. Kukla he could borrow the 
tractor and baler without any payment. Mr. Robertson had Mr. Kukla use the tractor and baler 
on Mr. Robertson's own fieid ensuring that Mr. Kukla could operate the equipment properly 
During the daytime, Mr. Kukla took the tractor and baler off of Mr. Robertson's property. 
Mr. Robertson followed using his pickup as a pilot vehicle. On July 30, 2003, Mr. Kukla drove 
the tractor and baler on a roadway at night in order to take the tractor and baler to his truck to 
obtain items necessary to repair the baler. 
Mr. Kenneth Tiegs was driving his vehicle on that same roadway. Mr. Tiegs's vehicle 
impacted the rear of the baler. Mr. Tiegs did not survive the impact. Plaintiffs are the family of 
Mr. Tiegs and the corporation owning the vehicle Mr. Tiegs was operating. 
The appeal involves the legal questions raised by Mr. Robertson's motions for summary 
judgment on the claims of negligent entrustment, negligence per se and imputed liability and the 
district court's decision thereon. This appeal also is directed at the district court's decision to 
grant Plaintiffs a new trial. 
B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 26, 2004. R, p. 11. Defendant Robertson was 
served on May 8, 2004. In their initial Complaint, Plaintiffs named only two Defendants: 1) 
Defendant Kukla, as the operator of the tractor and baler at the time of the accident, and 2) 
Darrell Robertson, as the owner of the tractor and baler. Id. In this initial Complaint, Plaintiffs 
alleged the following four causes of action against Defendants: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent 
Entrustment; (3) Negligence Per Se; and (4) Imputed Liability pursuant to Idaho Code 3 49- 
2417(1). R, pp. 11-22. Plaintiffs' Negligence claim mentioned only "Defendants" and contained 
no factual allegations against Defendant Robertson. R, pp. 14-15. The three remaining claims, 
Negligent Entrustment, Negligence Per Se and Imputed Liability specifically make reference to 
the conduct of Defendant Robertson and are the subject of this motion. R, pp. 15-20. 
Defendant Robertson's Answer and Demand for Jury Trial denying liability was filed on 
May 28,2004. R, p. 23. 
Defendant Kukla failed to respond to the initial Complaint filed by Plaintiffs and a 
Default Judgment was entered against him by this Court on June 28,2004. R, ~ . ' 3 2 .  
PlaintifY's First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("First Amended 
Complaint") was filed on or about September 21,2005. R, p. 35. 
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint added Defendant Mike Kulcla as a party and added a 
fifth cause of action for Respondeat Superior Liability against Defendant Mike Kukla. R, pp. 35 
and 44. The substance of the allegations against Defendant Robertson remained unchanged. R, 
pp. 35-44. 
Defendant Robertson's Answer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial was filed on September 29,2005. R, p. 48. 
Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Summary Judgment was field on November 3, 
2005. R, p. 62. 
Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 8, 2006. 
R, p. 230. Defendant Robertson also filed a memorandum in support of the motion for summary 
judgment along with the Affidavits of Darrell L. Robertson and Michael A. Pope on February 8, 
2006. R, p. 482, Exhibit "Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment - February 8,2006"; R, p. 233 and R, p. 237. 
Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 23,2006. 
Defendant Robertson then filed Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on March 1, 2006. R, p. 482, Exhibit "Defendant 
Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment - March 
1,2006." 
Judge Renae J. Hoff heard oral arguments on Defendant Robertson's motion for 
summary judgment on March 8,2006. Tr. "Summary Judgment Hearing -March 8,2006", p. 4. 
Judge Hoff denied the motion for summary judgment. Id. at pp. 23-28. 
Following Judge Hoff s ruling, Judge Gordon W. Petrie was assigned the file for 
purposes of trial. 
The initial trial was begun on September 21, 2007. R, p. 464. The initial trial ended in a 
mistrial on September 25,2007. Id 
Following the mistrial, Defendant Robertson filed Defendant Robertson's Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Allegations of Negligent 
Entrustment, Negligence Per Se and Imputed Liability on December 7,2007. Id. 
Plaintiffs filed the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on December 20,2007. R, p. 399. 
Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Allegations of Negligent Entrustment, Negligence Pev Se and Imputed 
Liability was filed on December 27,2007. R, p. 464. 
Judge Petrie heard oral arguments on the motion on January 3, 2008. Tr., "Motion for 
Summary Judgment - January 3,2008", p. 1. Judge Petrie took the matter under advisement and 
subsequently issued the Memorandum Decision on Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 7,2008. R, p. 4 18. 
Trial took place from July 14, 2008 to July 19, 2008. The jury returned the following 
responses to the special interrogatories: 
WE, THE JURY, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Questions 1 : Was Defendant Darrell L. Robertson negligent in loaning the tractor 
and hay baler to Defendant Dustin M. Kukla? 
Y E S X  NO - 
... 
Ouestion 2: Was the negligence of Defendant Darrell L. Robertson a proximate 
cause of the death of the Decedent and any injuries to the Plaintiff? 
YES- NO 
... 
Ouestion 3: Was the negligence of Defendant Dustin M. Kukla a proximate cause 
of the death of the Decedent and any injuries to the Plaintiff? 
Y E S 2  NO __ 
. . . 
Ouestion 4: Did Defendant Darrell Robertson negligently entrust Defendant 
Dustin Kukla with a tractor and hay baler? 
YES- NO 
. . . 
Ouestion 6: Did Defendant Dustin Kukla operate the tractor and baler on the 
highway and at the time of the occurrence with the express implied permission of 
Defendant Darrell Robertson? 
YES- NO & 
. . . 
Ouestion 8: Was the Decedent, Kenneth Tiegs, negligent in the operation of his 
vehicle at the time and place of the occurrence in question? 
Y E S X  NO - 
. . . 
Question 9: Was the Decedent, Kenneth Tiegs', negligent [sic] in the operation of 
his vehicle at the time and place of the occurrence in question a proximate cause 
of his death? 
YES- NO X 
... 
If nine or more of you answered "Yes" to any of the questions 2, 3, 5, or 7, 
proceed to Question 10. If, however, you answered "No" to 4 of these 
questions you are done. 
Special Verdict Form, pp. 1-9 
Question 10: In this question, you apportion fault between the parties in 
terms of percentage. As to each party, determine the percentage of fault for that 
party and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to 
Question 8, you must enter "0" (zero) as to Decedent Kenneth Tiegs. However, 
whatever percentages you enter with regard to each of the parties, the sum of the 
percentages must equal 100% (one hundred percent). Therefore, what is the 
percentage of fault as to each of the following: 
As to Defendant Darrell Robertson? 15% 
As to Defendant Dustin Kukla? 80% 
As to Decedent Kenneth Tiegs? 5% 
Id. at 10. 
Total must equal 100% 
Id. at 11. 
Question 11: We assess the Plaintiffs' damages in the following amount: 
As to Plaintiff Bruce Tiegs: $ 2,500 001100 
As to Plaintiff Steven Tiegs: $ 2.500 001100 
As to Plaintiff Susan Huter: $ 2.500 00/100 
Id. at 12. 
Followii~g the trial, Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial on August 21,2008. 
Defendant Robertson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New 
Trial on September 4, 2008. Plaintiffs' filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for New Trial on September 1 1,2008. 
Judge Petrie heard oral arguments on the issue on September 15, 2008. Tr., "Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial - September 15, 2008", p. 19. On October 20, 2008, Judge Petrie issued 
the Order on Motion for New Trial. R, p. 453. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed by Defendant Robertson on November 28, 2009. R, p. 
457. 
C) STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In late July 2003, Appellate Robertson was contacted by Mr. Kukla in regards to 
borrowing a tractor and baler owned by Appellate Robertson so that Mr. Kukla could bale straw 
purchased from the Schroll family. R, p. 252, Deposition of Darrell L. Robertson, p. 39,ll. 7-17. 
Appellate Robertson was advised by Mr. Kukla that he had originally intended to use his 
grandfather's baler to complete the baling ofthe field owned by the Schroll family. Id. at 11. 14- 
17. According to Mr. Kukla, he offered to pay Appellate Robertson for the use of the tractor and 
baler. R, p. 304, Deposition of Darrell L. Robertson, p. 107, 1. 8-p. 11 1, 1. 10. This offer was 
denied by Appellate Robertson and he loaned the tractor and baler to Mr. Kukla in order to help 
him out and was not expecting to be compensated for the use of this equipment. See R, p. 234, 
Affidavit of Darrel Robertson, 7 2. 
The tractor and baler were picked up by Mr. Kukla during the daytime at a property 
owned by Appellate Robertson. R, p. 258, Deposition of Darrell L. Robertson, p. 61,l. 21-p. 63, 
1. 18; R, p. 304, Deposition of Dustin M. Kukla, p.105, 1. 12-p. 107, 1. 21. At the time ofthe 
entrustment, Appellate Robertson was advised by Mr. Kukla that the tractor and baler would be 
used for the purpose of baling straw on private property owned by the Schroll family. R, p. 253, 
Deposition of Darrell L. Robertson, p. 41, 1. 4-p. 47, 1. 17. Prior to allowing Mr. Kukla to 
borrow the tractor and baler, Appellate Robertson made sure that Mr. Kulcla knew how to 
properly operate the tractor and baler for this intended purpose by having him complete a portion 
of the field that Appellate Robertson had been baling. Id.; R, p. 234, Affidavit of Darrel 
Robertson, li 4. 
On July 30, 2003, Mr. Kukla was baling straw on the Schroll property just off of 
Missouri Avenue in Nampa, Idaho. R, p. 308, Deposition of Dustin M. Kukla, p. 123, 11. 7-19. 
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Mr. Kukla drove the tractor and baler onto Missouri Avenue for a 
short distance and then turned right onto Highway 45 to take the tractor and baler to his vehicle 
for repairs. Id. p.129, 1. 4-p.134, 1. 22. After traveling approximately 150-200 yards down 
Highway 45, the baler was struck from behind by the Mercury Sable driven by Mr. Kenneth 
Tiegs. R, p. 311, Deposition of Dustin M. Kukla, p. 135, 1. 23- p. 136, 1. 3. As a result of the 
collision, between the tractor and baler being operated by Mr. Kukla and Mr. Tiegs' Mercury 
Sable, Mr. Tiegs was killed. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A) Whether Appellate Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Have Been 
Granted by the District Court? 
1 .  Whether I.C. 9 49-2417(1) Imputes Liability upon the Owner of an Implement of 
Husbandry Which Implement has Been Borrowed by a Person That Negligently 
Uses the Implement Causing Injury to a Third-Party? 
2. Whether Appellate Robertson Knowingly Permitted Mr. Kukla to Operate the 
subject Vehicle at Nighttime in Violation of LC. $9 49-902,903 and 916? 
3. Whether Respondent Failed to Provide Sufficient Evidence to Establish the 
Elements of Negligent Entrustment? 
B) Whether the Jury's Verdict that Appellate Robertson's Actions were not a 
Proximate Cause of the Respondent's Injuries Should be Upheld? 
111. ARGUMENT 
This brief establishes that (A) the District Court should have granted Appellant's motion 
for summary judgment and (£3) the District Court should have denied Respondent's motion for 
new trial following the trial. 
A) The District Court Should Have Granted Appellate Robertson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
1. Standard of Review 
I.R.C.P. 56 sets forth the criteria for granting summary judgment. The rule states that, if 
the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith. I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of genuine issues of material 
fact. See Yoakum v. Hartfard Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 17 1, 923 P.2d 41 6 (1 996). Once this 
burden has been met, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). The facts'are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the 
motion, who is also to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that might be reasonably 
drawn from the evidence. Anderson v. ~ t h i n ~ h n ,  103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). 
Although inferences may be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, a mere scintilla of evidence 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Rather, there must be evidence upon which a jury 
can rely. Taylor v. Choules, 102 Idaho 220, 626 P.2d 1056 (1981); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear 
Corp., 94 Idaho 917,500 P.2d 218 (1972). "Judgment shall be granted to the moving party if the 
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the 
party's case." McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948,950-51,88 P.3d 767,769-70 (2004). 
The purpose of I.R.C.P. 56 is to eliminate the time and cost involved in bringing an 
action to trial when the end result would be a directed verdict: 
The purpose of the rule is to allow the court to pierce the pleadings in order to eliminate 
groundless denials and paper issues in cases which would end in directed verdicts or 
other rules of law. 
. . . the rule itself, in permitting summary judgment where "no genuine issue of any 
material fact" appears, plainly requires more to forestall summary judgment than the 
raising of the "slightest doubt" as to the facts. 
LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422, 428, 614 P.2d 962, 968 (1980) (citing Tri State National 
Bankv. Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543,545,447 P.2d 41 1,412 (1968)). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
475-76, 50 P.3d 488,490-91 (2002). 
2. I.C. 6 49-2417 (1) Does Not Impute Liability upon the Owner of an Implement of 
Husbandry Which Implement has Been Borrowed by a Person That Ne~linentlv Uses the 
mlemen t  Causing Injury to a Third-Partv. 
This inquiry involves the interpretation of specific provisions of the Idaho Code. The 
construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of law for this Court to decide. Crawford v. 
Dept. of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999). Courts also exercise free 
review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 
1213, 1216, (1999). 
"Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes by ascertaining and giving effect 
to legislative intent." Easley v. Lee, 11 1 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986) citing: Nampa 
Lodge No. I389 v. Smyle, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1951). "The act should be construed in its 
entirety and as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, and where different 
sections reflect light upon each other they are regarded as inpari materia." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, "'all parts of a statute should be given meaning,' 
and the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered 
superfluous or insignificant."' Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007) 
citing: Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 
The relevant statutes in this matter are all found in the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act (the 
"Act"). 
Idaho Code § 49-2417(1) provides: 
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury 
to a person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor 
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or 
operating the vehicle with the permission, express implied, of the owner, and the 
negligence of the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil 
damages. (Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code $i 49-2417(1) by its plain language applies only to "motor vehicles" as 
defined in this statute and not to the tractor and baler that are at issue in this lawsuit. A motor 
vehicle is defined under I.C. 5 49-123(g) as: 
Every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by 
electric power obtained by overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, 
except vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive 
mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs. 49-123(g) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-1 10(2), the applicable definitions section of the Act, a farm 
tractor when drawing an implement of husbandq such as a baler is to be defined as an 
implement of husbandry for purposes of the Act: 
"Implements of husbandry" means every vehicle including self-propelled units, designed 
or adapted and used exclusively in agricultural, horticultural, dairy and livestock growing 
and feeding operations when being incidentally operated. Such implements include, but 
are not limited to, combines, discs, dry and liquid fertilizer spreaders, cargo tanks, 
harrows, hay balers, harvesting and stacking equipment, pesticide applicators, plows, 
swathers, mint tubs and mint wagons, and farm wagons. A farm tractor when attached to 
or drawing any implement of husbandry shall be construed to be an implement of 
husbandry. "Implements of husbandry" do not include semitrailers, nor do they include 
motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits their use to agricultural, horticultural, 
dairy or livestock growing and feeding operations. (Emphasis added). 
This provision specifically states that implements of husbandry do not include motor 
vehicles. Because the tractor and baler are defined as an implement of husbandry and not as a 
motor vehicle for purposes of the Act, the legislature has through its definitions exempted 
imnplements of husbandry from the imputed liability provision of Idaho Code $$ 49-2417(1). 
Where, as here, Idaho Code $3 49-2417(1) specifically applies only to motor vehicles, implements 
of husbandry are excluded from imputed liability pursuant to this provision of the Act. Under 
the rule of statutory interpretation expuessio unius est exclusio alterius, as well as the plain 
language of the statutes themselves, Idaho Code § 49-2417(1) is inapplicable to the case at bar. 
See Poison Creek Publishing, Inc., v. Central Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426,3 P.3d 1254 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
The District Court in addressing these statutes went too far in attempting to peer into why 
the Idaho Legislature chose to exempt implements of husbandry and ended by making a decision 
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. R, pp. 444-451. Essentially, the District Court 
inserted its own legislative intent into to the Act and created new law. The District Court 
essentially holds that, "if the legislature wanted to exclude 'implements of husbandry,' from 
Idaho's imputed negligence statute, it would have done so." R, p. 451. The District Court failed 
to recognize that silence or ambiguity in a statute can be interpreted two ways. Where it is true 
that the Idaho Legislature could have specifically excluded implements of husbandry, it could 
have as easily specifically included implements of husbandry. Thus the Idaho Legislature's 
silence does not show intent to include i~llplements of husbandry under I.C. § 49-2417. 
By defining implements of husbandry in I.C. 49-1 10(2), the Idaho Legislature shows its 
intent to not treat implements of husbandry as motor vehicles. Even the District Court 
essentially admitted that many, if not most implements of husbandry would be excluded from 
I.C. § 49-2417. The District Court stated that, "To be sure, hay balers do not constitute motor 
vehicles." Id. Here the District Court holds that despite the Idaho Legislature not specifically 
excluding implements of husbandry from I.C. 8 49-2417, it does exclude hay balers and any 
other implements of husbandry not sew-propelled. 
Two hypothetical scenarios will further illustrate the inconsistency of the District Court's 
opinion with the Legislature's intent as expressed in I.C. 49-1 10(2). In the first case, a farmer 
knowingly lends a hay baler to a neighbor with a defective hitch and a tractor with non- 
functioning lighting equipment.  he neighbor begins transporting the hay baler by tractor along 
a roadway at night. The hitch slips and the hay baler is left sitting on the roadway unattached to 
the tractor with no lighting. A car impacts the hay baler. Under the District Court's 
interpretation of I.C. 49-2417, there is no imputed 'liability because the hay baler is an 
implement of husbandry not hooked up to a tractor. 
The second case is the same as the first except the car swerves and misses the hay baler 
but further down the roadway runs into the tractor. In this circumstance, the tractor by itself 
qualifies as a motor vehicle and would fall under the strictures of I.C. 5 49-2417. 
The above examples demonstrate that the District Court's decision rests solely upon its 
determination that when you add a tractor to an implement of husbandry, then it becomes a 
motor vehicle for purposes of I.C. 3 49-2417. This reasoning is directly contrary to the Idaho 
Legislature's decision to specifically change the status of a tractor to an implement of husbandry 
when it is connected to an implement of husbandry. LC. 5 49-1 10(2) states: "A farm tractor 
when attached to or drawing any implement of husbandry shall be construed to be an implement 
of husbandry." The Idaho Legislature by making this specific designation recognizes that by 
itself a tractor would fall under the general definition of a motor vehicle, and therefore, the 
Legislature took the effort to statutorily change a tractor's status when attached to an implement 
of husbandry. 
The Idaho Legislature's intent is that tractors while attached to implements of husbandry 
should be treated as implements of husbandry, and not that implements of husbandry be treated 
as motor vehicles when attached to a tractor. The Legislature's intent then is that a hay baler 
should not be treated differently under the Act simply because it is attached to a tractor. 
Interpreting I.C. 5 49-2417 to apply to this hay baler would be going against the plain intent of 
the Legislature. 
Based upon the plain intent of the Idaho Legislature, Appellant's request that this Court 
reverse the District Court's decision and rule that I.C. 3 49-2417 does not apply to hay balers 
even when they are attached to tractors. 
3. Awwellant did not Cause or Knowingly Permit the Oweration of the Subiect 
Vehicle at Nighttime in Violation of I.C. 66 49-902.903 and 916. 
This inquiry also involves the interpretation of Idaho statutes and the previously provided 
case citations regarding statutory interpretation apply in this instance and throughout our brief. 
Respondents' First Amended Complaint alleges negligence per se against Appellant. 
Resljondents' allegation of negligence per se in this case is predicates on the improper 
interpretation of I.C. 5 49-916. In support of their claim for negligence per se against Appellant, 
Respondents alleged that "[bly allowing Mr. Dustin Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on a 
public road after sunset without visible tail lights or reflectors, Appellate Robertson was in direct 
violation of the provisions of Idaho Code 3 49-916." R, p. 42, Plaintiffs First Amended 
complaint, ll 37. 
The relevant provisions relating to this question are Idaho Code $5 49-902(1) and (3); 49- 
903; 49-916(3) and (4). Idaho Code 5 49-902(1) and (3) state (Emphasis added): 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in an unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not 
contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with the lamps and other requirements 
in proper condition and adjustment, as required by the provisions of this chapter, or 
which is equipped in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter, with respect to equipment on vehicles, shall not apply 
to implements of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or slow moving 
vehicles except as otherwise specifically made applicable. 
Idaho Code 5 49-903 states: 
Every vehicle upon a highway at any time from sunset to sunrise and at any other 
time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and 
vehicles on the highway at a distance of five hundred (500) feet ahead shall display 
lighted lamps and illuminating devices as here respectively required for different 
classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles as stated 
herein. 
Idaho Code 5 49-916(3) and (4) state: 
(3) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled unit of farm equipment or 
implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting system shall at all times 
specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with two (2) single-beam or 
multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of sections 49-922 or 49-924, 
Idaho Code, respectively or, as an alternative, section 49-926, Idaho Code, and two 
(2) red lamps visible from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet to the 
rear, or in the alternative, one (1) red lamp visible from a distance of not less than 
five hundred (500) feet to the rear and two (2) red reflectors visible from a distance 
of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to the rear when illuminated by the 
upper beams of head lamps. Red lamps or reflectors shall be mounted in the rear 
of the farm tractor or self-propelled implement of husbandry to indicate as nearly 
as practicable the extreme left and right projections of the vehicle on the highway. 
(4) The farm tractor element of every combination of farm tractor and towed farm 
equipment or towed implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting 
system shall at all times specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with 
two (2) single-beam or multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of 
sections 49-922,49-924, or 49-926, Idaho Code. 
These provisions of the Idaho Code prohibit the operation of an implement of husbandry 
on a public roadway between "sunset" and "sunrise" and "at any other time when there is not 
sufficient light" without the equipment required by LC. § 49-916. This standard applies to any 
person operating the relevant machinery. 
The statutoG duty of an owner of an implement of husbandry is further limited by LC. § 
49-902(1) at times when they are not the operator of the vehicle, by requiring that there be a 
showing the owner "cause[d] or lcnowingly permit[ted] to be driven" a vehicle that is in violation 
of the specific requirements of the chapter. I.C. $49-902(1) 
The question of whether a statute imposes a duty upon a particular person or entity is a 
question of law which the Court freely reviews. Mugavero v. A-1 Auto Sales, Inc., 130 Idaho 
554, 557,954 P.2d 141, 154 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, in reviewing Respondent's negligence 
per se claim, this Court may make its own determination for purposes of appeal whether the 
statute cited by Respondents establishes a duty on behalf of Appellant as a matter of law 
Once the extent of the duty is established, negligence per se does not differ in its legal 
consequences from ordinary negligence. Vaughn v. Porter, 140 Idaho 470,95 P.3d 88, (Ct. App. 
2004) (citing, Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001)). As the Supreme 
Court noted in Ahles: 
The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to 
conclusively prove the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence. Slade 
v. Smith's Management Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991). 
Negligence per se lessens the plaintiffs burden only on the issue of the "actor's 
departure from the standard of conduct required of a reasonable man." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS !j 288B cmt. B (1965). Thus, the 
elements of duty and breach are "taken away from the jury." See Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts 230 (5th ed.1984). 
As stated, the Idaho Legislature created a separate duty under I.C. § 49-902(1) for owners 
when they are not the operator of their vehicle. The Idaho Legislature has also created a separate 
standard for implements of husbandry than for other vehicles. In order to establish their claim 
for negligence per se, Respondents must establish that Appellant either caused Mr. Kukla or 
knowingly permitted Mr. Kukla to drive or move the tractor and baler on Highway 45 after 
sunset. 
The District Court began by setting forth the appropriate statutes in its decision, but it 
then misapplied the holding of State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 6 P.3d 416 (Ct.App. 2000) in 
finding that an owner of an implement of husbandry cannot cause or knowingly pennit their 
implement of husbandry to be operated on a roadway al any time unless they have the equipment 
required by I.C. § 49-916. R, p. 441. 
The Evans case is not directly applicable in this matter because it did not involve an 
implement of husbandry which is treated differently than a normal vehicle under LC. 9 49-902. 
In Evans an individual was pulled over for driving a car with only one operational headlight in 
violation of LC. $3 49-902 and 905. Evans, 134 Idaho at 562, 6 P.3d at 418. The driver was 
ultimately found to be intoxicated and was arrested for DUI. Id. Counsel for the driver argued 
that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, because the vehicle was 
being operated prior to sunset. Id. Counsel for driver asserted that the requirements of I.C. 3 49- 
902(l) and I.C. 3 49-905 are limited to those times specified in I.C. 5 49-903. Id. at 563-564,6 
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held: 
By its plain language, this section [I.C. 3 49-9031 only states when headlights 
must be turned on. This statute does not authorize the operation of vehicles with 
inoperable headlights on Idaho highways. For numerous reasons, operable 
headlights may be unexpectedly required long before sunset: sudden changes of 
weather; agricultural dust; smoke from burning fields or forest fires to name a few. We 
therefore conclude that Evans' reading of I.C. 3 49-903 as permitting the operation of 
vehicles with inoperable headlights before sunset inconsistent with Idaho's policy of 
providing a safe highway system. 
Id. at 564, 6 P.3d at 420. 
The District Court applied this language in its holding to Appellant's implement of 
husbandry. This determination overlooked the fact that the interpretation of the language in I.C. 
$ 5  49-902(1) and 49-905 that were at issue in Evans is not applicable to implements of 
husbandry, which require a review of LC. $3  49-902(3) and 49-916. The difference in the 
language between these two sets of provisions is crucial in analyzing the duty of Appellant in 
this case. 
Idaho Code § 49-902(1) must be filtered through I.C. 3 49-902(3) which states plainly 
that, "The provisions of this chapter (including I.C. 3 49-902(1)), with respect to equipment on 
vehicles, shall not apply to implements of husbandry . . . except as otherwise specifically made 
applicable." I.C. § 49-902(3) emphasis added). The Idaho Legislature essentially stated that 
LC. $ 49-902(1) has no applicability to implements of husbandry unless some provision 
specifically makes it applicable. The Legislature's plain intent is to treat implements of 
husbandry different from other motor vehicles. 
The equipment rules for implements of husbandry are then specifically set forth in LC. 3  
49-916. Unlike I.C. 3  49-905 that was interpreted in Evans, I.C. $ 49-916 contains the following 
language preceding the equipment requirements in each of its major subparagraphs, "shall at all 
times specified in section 49-903". Idaho Code $ 49-916 limits the equipment requirements to 
the times set forth in I.C. $ 49-903, not the times set forth in I.C. $ 49-902(1). The inclusion of 
the specific reference to I.C. $ 49-903 in I.C. $ 49-916 is especially revealing considering the 
omission of any reference to I.C. 3  49-903 in LC. $3 49-905,906,907, 909 and 915. 
The differing treatment of implements of husbandry is appropriate considering the fact 
that many implements of husbandry only rarely travel on roadways and do not often come with 
built in lighting equipment. Often the dictates of 1.C. 3  49-916 are met in regards to implements 
of husbandry by using removable lamps and reflectors. Removable lighting equipment prevents 
damage to the lighting equipment while the implement of husbandry is in use in the fields. It is 
very logical therefore to only require lighting equipment during the time periods set forth in 1.C. 
$49-903. 
The Legislature's intent is further illuminated by the on~ission in LC. 3 49-916 of 
paragraph (7) of LC. $ 49-905, which makes failure to comply with the provisions of LC. 3  49- 
905 an infraction. Again, this shows the great difference in the statutes being interpreted in the 
Evans case and those specific provisions involved in the present matter. The holding in Evans is 
not applicable in this matter due to the differing statutes that apply. The District Court should 
not have relied on the holding in Evans in reaching his decision. 
Based upon the plain meaning of the statutes that apply to Appellant's implement of 
husbandry, in order for Respondent to prove negligence per se under I.C. 5 49-916 Respondent 
must provide evidence that Appellant caused or knowingly permitted Mr. Kulcla to operate the 
tractor and hay baler on a roadway at night. The record is devoid of evidence that Appellant 
even knew that Mr. Kukla would operate the tractor and hay baler upon a roadway at night. 
The tractor and baler were loaned to Mr. Kukla and transported from Appellate 
Robertson's property during the daytime, not after sunset. R, p. 258, Deposition of Darrell L. 
Robertson, p. 62, 1. 21-p. 63,l. 11. Mr. Kultla advised Appellate Robertson only that he nceded 
to use the tractor and baler to complete the baling of a field owned by the Schroll family. Id at 
p. 39,ll. 7-17. Prior to the night of the accident, Appellate Robertson went to the Schroll family 
field and personally observed Mr. Kukla baling straw in the field. R, p. 233, T 5. Mr. Kukla 
testified that it was his own decision to transport the tractor and baler on Highway 45 in order to 
fix a broken shear pin on the baler. R, p. 276, Deposition of Dustin M. Kukla, p. 132, 11. 1-23. 
According to Mr. Kukla, his tools were in his pickup at a different site on Highway 45 and he, 
"didn't't want to walk clear down there" in order to fix the baler. Id Based on this record, 
Respondents have previously conceded that Appellate Robertson "may not have had actual 
knowledge of (Mr. Kukla's) likelihood of driving the tractor and baler at night without tail 
lights". R, p. 482, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, February 23,2006, p. 10. 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case as recognized even by Respondents, there is no 
evidence that Appellate Robertson caused or knowingly permitted Mr. Kukla to operate the 
tractor and baler on a public roadway at night. The evidence provided by Rcspondents simply 
shows that there was a possibility that the tractor and hay baler may have been operated on the 
roadway at night. This evidence does not rise to the requirement of proving lmowledge on 
behalf of Appellant that the tractor and hay baler would be operated on a roadway at night. 
Appellant is not liable for the negligent acts of Mr. KuMa under Respondents' allegation 
of negligence per se, and is not independently liable under this theory because he did not cause 
or knowingly permit Mr. Kukla to move the tractor and baler on a pubic roadway during the 
times specified in I.C. 5 49-903. 
Appellant therefore requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decision and hold 
that Appellant is entitled to summary judgment on Respondents' claim of negligence per se. 
4. Respondents Failed to Provide Sufficient Evidence to Establish the Elements of 
Negligent Entrustment. 
Respondents allege that Appellate Robertson is liable under the theory of negligent 
entrustment. R, p. 35, 33 23-29. The application of the doctrine of negligent entrustment to the 
facts of this case is not justified based on the analysis of the establishment and development of 
the necessary elements of negligent entrustment under Idaho law. The tort of negligent 
entrustment was first recognized in Idaho in Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 
(1973). In Kinney, Plaintiffs alleged that the owner of a motor vehicle was directly negligent for 
knowingly permitting an unlicensed driver to operate the vehicle. Id. at 329, 508 P.2d at 1235. 
The Supreme Courl of Idaho held that owner of the vehicle could be held liable beyond the limits 
of Idaho Code § 49-1404, then Idaho's imputed liability statute, if the evidence established that 
the defendant furnished the "vehicle to an incompetent driver". Id. In a footnote, the Court then 
adopted the tort of negligent entrustment by stating: 
"If, on remand, the plaintiffs should desire to pursue the issue of negligent 
entrustment to an intoxicated driver, the district court should allow the 
amendment of the complaint nuncpro tunc to specifically set forth this conduct. 
Id. Thus, under Idaho law, the tort of negligent entrustment as first adopted required that 
Plaintiff establish that the defendant furnished the vehicle to an incompetent or otherwise 
incapacitated driver. 
In Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), the Supreme Court of Idaho 
was asked to determine whether the sale of alcoholic beverages to "an actually, apparently and 
obviously intoxicated person known to be minor" could establish liability against the vendor for 
the subsequent negligent operation of an automobile by the minor. Id. at 618, 619 P.2d at 136. 
In its analysis of this issue, the court wrote: 
Subsequent to Meade, this Court in Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328,408 P.2d 1234 (1973), 
held that a car owner who lends his vehicle to an unlicensed driver may be liable not only 
on a theory of imputed negligence, but also on the basis of the owner's independent 
negligence in entrusting the automobile to the unauthorized driver. In a footnote, we 
indicated that negligent entrustment of an automobile to one who is intoxicated would 
also be actionable. Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho at 331, 508 P.2d at 1237, at n. 1. 
The "negligent entrustment" tort approved in Kinney is recognition of the risk of injury 
which exists when two ingredients are combined; the automobile and an incompetent or 
inca~acitated driver. In Kinney, we said that a party may be liable for providing an 
intoxicated individual with an automobile. The issue in this case is the converse, i.e., 
should a party ever be held liable for providing the driver of an automobile with 
intoxicants. 
Id. at 620,619 P.2d at 138 (Emphasis Added). 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. in Alegria, the tort of negligent entrustment as 
recognized in Idaho again required that Plaintiff establish the entrustment of an instrumentality to either 
an incompetent or incapacitated driver. As the court stated in Alegria, the adoption of the tort of 
negligent entrustment in Idaho was predicated upon the existence of two factors: a vehicle and an 
incompetent or incapacitated driver. The element of an incompetent or incapacitated driver served as 
one of the two defining elements of the tort of negligent entrustment from its earliest stages in Idaho. 
The next important Idaho case addressing the doctrine of negligent entrustment after Kinney and 
Alegria was Ransom v. City ofGarden City, 113 Idaho 202,743 P.2d 70 (1987). In Ransom, a Garden 
City police officer gave the keys of a vehicle to a passenger that the officer knew was intoxicated after 
he arrested the vehicle's driver. After relying upon its previous analysis in the Kinney and Alegria 
cases, the Supreme Court of Idaho cited the following definition of the tort of negligent entrustment 
from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 308 (1965) in Ransom: 
"Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in Activities. 
"It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or engage in an activity which is 
under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends 
or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to 
create an unreasonable risk of hann to others." 
In Ransom, the Supreme Court in citing to the restatement references Comment B to 5 308, 
which further defines the meaning of an incompetent or incapacitated driver as adopted in Kinney and 
Alegria: 
The comments explain that the rule is most frequently applied "where the person is a 
member of a class which is notoriously likely to misuse the thing which the actor permits 
him to use." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 308 comment b (1965). The rule may 
also apply "if the third person's known character or the peculiar circumstances of the case 
are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse it." 
Id See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 illustration 2 (1965) ("A lends his 
car to B, whom he knows to be intoxicated. B's intoxicated condition leads him to cause 
harm to C. A is negligent toward C."). 
The most common factual scenarios to which the negligent entrustment rule is applied are 
those where a loaded firearm is entrusted to a minor or where an automobile is entrusted 
to an obviously intoxicated person. 
113 Idaho at 206-1,743 P.2d at 74-5. 
The District Court in its decision recognized the elements of negligent entrustment as 
they apply generally in the United States by citing 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence $ 3 18 (2004) 
as follows: 
In an action based on the theory of negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) the entrustee was incompetent, unfit, inexperienced, or reckless; 
(2) the entrustor knew (in some jurisdictions "actually" knew), should have known, 
or had reason to know of the entrustee's condition of proclivities; 
(3) there was an entrustment of the dangerous instrumentality; 
(4) the entrustment created an appreciable risk of harm to others; and 
(5) the harm to the injury victim was "proximately" or "legally" caused by the 
negligence of the entrustor and the entrustee. 
In recognizing these elements, it the District Court seems to have agreed that two of the 
necessary elements for a claim of negligent entrustment are an incompetent driver and prior 
knowledge by the owner of the borrower's incompetence. 
Based on review of the Kinney, Alegria and Ransom, the necessity of proving that the 
vehicle or instrument was entrusted to an incompetent or incapacitated driver is fundamental to 
establishing a claim for negligent entrustment under Idaho law. It appears that Idaho Case law 
essentially recognizes the same elements as stated in 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence $ 318 
(2004). 
A brief review of Idaho case law shows a consistent requirement that plaintiffs prove that 
the vehicle or instrument was entrusted to an incompetent or incapacitated driver in order to 
establish a claim for negligent entrustment Each of the reported cases involving allegations of 
negligent entrustment following Ransom, the individuals entrusted with the vehicles were either 
intoxicated or unauthorized by law to operate the vehicles, and the person entrusting them with 
the vehicles was aware of these facts. See Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 P.2d 1225 
(1988) (nineteen-year-old driver had a lengthy record of traffic violations and convictions, 
inchding driving under the influence), Olguin v. City of Burley, 1 19 Idaho 721, 810 P.2d 255 
(1991) (police officers released vehicle to intoxicated driver after advising him not to drive), and 
Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho 251, 833 P.2d 109 (1992) (defendant allegedly entrusted three-year- 
old toddler with snowmobile). 
In this case, it is not contested that Appellate Robertson permitted Mr. Kukla to operate the 
tractor and baler in order to bale straw on private property. Respondents, however, have failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that Appellant knew or should have known that Mr. Kukla was an 
incompetent, unfit or reckless operator at the time the hay baler was entrusted to Mr. Kukla. At the 
time of the entrustment, Appellant was advised by Mr. Kukla that the tractor and baler would be used 
for the purpose of baling straw on private property owned by the Schroll family. R, p. 253, Deposition 
of Darrel L. Robertson, p. 41,l. 4-p. 47,l. 17. When Appellate Robertson loaned the tractor and baler 
to Mr. Kukla it was daytime, not nighttime. Id. Prior to allowing Mr. Kukla to borrow the tractor and 
baler, Appellate Robertson made sure that Mr. Kulcla knew how to properly operate the tractor and 
baler for its intended use by having him complete a portion of the field that Appellate Robertson had 
been baling. R, p. 233, 7 4. Appellate Robertson had previously loaned Mr. Kukla a flail chopper 
wluch had been returned without incident. R, p. 247, Deposition of Darrcll L. Robertson, p. 16, I. 18- 
p. 17, 1. 3, p. 22, 1. 22-p. 23, 1. 17. Thus, at the time of the entrustment of the tractor and baler to Mr. 
Kukla, Appellate Robertson's previous experience with loaning equipment to Mr. Kukla had been 
positive. The evidence suggests that Appellant's knowledge of Mr. Kukla at the time of entrustment 
was that he was a competent, responsible operator of farm equipment. 
In the face of this evidence, Respondents attempt to rely on vague and speculative evidence to 
support their assertions. Respondents allege that the mere fact that the lighting equipment on the hay 
baler did not work coupled with a nonspecific understanding that some farmers bale hay at night 
shows that Appellant knew or should have known that Mr. Kukla was an incompetent or reckless 
driver. R, p. 482, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, February 23, 2006, p. 10. This evidence is too speculative to create a jury 
question regarding whether Appellant knew or should have known Mr. Kukla was an incompetent or 
reckless operator. The jury would have to impermissibly guess at too many issues. See Antler v Cox, 
27Idaho 517,519, I49 P.731,733 (1915). 
The District Court apparently sensing the lack of evidence to support a negligent entrustment 
action, attempted to surmise what type of evidence may support a claim of negligent entrustment. 
"They [the jury] could very well base their decision upon expert testimony that in Canyon County, at 
least, one expects farmers and ranchers to drive balers on highways at night. The "expert" testimony 
could be nothing more than a series of farmers and ranchers testifying about common practices among 
their fellow ranchers and farmers, all of which they have personal familiarity." R, p. 435. Strangely, 
none of the evidence that the District Court suggests may be adequate was presented by Respondent in 
support of denying the motion for summary judgment. It seems the District Court's decision was 
impermissibly based upon evidence that was not part of the record. 
When analyzing the actual elements of negligent entrustment and the actual evidence 
before the District Court on summary judgment, Respondents' negligent enmstment claims fails 
as a matter of law. There is no evidence in this case that Appellate Robertson was aware, or had 
reason to be aware, that Mr. Kukla intended or was likely to use the tractor and baler in such a 
manner to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Appellate Robertson had no reason to 
believe that Mr. Kukla was a person who was a member of a class which was notoriously likely 
to misuse the tractor and baler. Mr. Kukla's known character and the peculiar circumstances of 
the case were not such that Appellate Robertson had reason to believe that Mr. Kulcla would 
misuse the tractor and baler. Unlike the negligent entrustment cases cited, there is no evidence 
that Appellate Robertson was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Kukla was an 
incompetent or incapacitated driver at the time of the entrustment, and that Mr. Kukla would 
violate Idaho law by operating the tractor and baler on a public roadway afier sunset. In this 
case, Appellate Robertson was entitled to rely on his understanding that the tractor and baler 
would be used only for the purpose of baling straw on property owned by the Schrolls because 
he had no actual or implied knowledge that Mr. Kukla would do otherwise. 
Appellant therefore requests that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling and grant 
Appellant's motion for summary judgment on the claim of negligent entrustment. 
B) The Jury's Verdict that Appellate Robertson's Actions were not a Proximate Cause 
of the Respondents' Injuries Should be Upheld? 
1. Standard of Review 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a): 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an 
action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the 
court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Misconduct of the jury 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinaq prudence could not have guarded against. 
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which the 
party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
the law. 
When faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look at the 
evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way." 
Cook v. State, Dept. o f T m p .  133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), G~ipth  v. Latham 
Motors, Inc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572, 576 (1996). 
2. The Jury's Verdict Should be Read to be Consistent. 
The jury consistently found that the actions of Darrell Robertson were not a proximate 
cause of Respondent's damages. The special verdict form instructed the jury that if they answered 
yes to the questions regarding proximate cause as to any of the claims for any of the parties, then 
they were to proceed to Question 10 pertaining to fault. Question 10 then instructed the jury to 
apportion fault. The jury is then advised that the sum must equal 100%. 
Respondent asserts that remedy for the alleged inconsistency in the Special Verdict form can 
be found in I. R.C.P. 49(b). Pursuant to I. R.C.P. 49(b): 
The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general 
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which 
is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may 
be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to 
render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to malce written 
answers and to render a general verdict. When the general verdict and the answers 
are harmonious, the court shall direct the entry of the appropriate judgment upon the 
verdict and answers. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or 
more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of 
judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict or 
may return the jury for M e r  consideration of its answers and verdict or may order 
a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is 
likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of 
judgment hut may return the jury for furt11er consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial. 
When faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look at the 
evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way." 
Cook v. State, Dept of Tramp. 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), Grzfith v. Latham 
Motors, Inc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572,576 (1996). 
In the present case, it is clear that the jury did not intend to fmd that the actions of Appellate 
Robertson were the proximate cause of Respondent's damages. Each time the question was asked 
with respect to proximate cause as to Appellate Robertson, the jury answered "No." If an 
inconsistency were found by the Court between the interrogatory answers and the verdict, Appellate 
Robertson would ask that the Court direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, 
and not grant a new trial in this matter. 
The verdict is also consistent with the evidence. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a): 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
. . . 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against the law. 
In order to grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) on the ground of insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law, the trial court must 
determine both (1) the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and (2) a new trial 
would produce a different result City ofMcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18, (Idaho 
2006); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373,788 P.2d 188 (1990). 
Appellate Robertson would assert that a new trial would not present a substantively different 
result. There is no evidence that the amount of the damages would be different. Furthermore, there 
is no indication that a new trial would result in the determination that Appellate Robertson was the 
proximate cause of Respondents' damages. In the present case, Respondents did not meet the 
burden of proof against Appellate Robertson. The jury clearly and unequivocally determined that 
the actiops of Appellate Robertson were not the proximate cause of Respondents' damages. 
Respondents are not entitled to a new trial. 
Respondents argued that the verdict is against the law as it allegedly violates the legal 
principles of negligence. Respondents have assumed, however, that by apportioning "fault" that the 
jury was indicating that Appellant was negligent and that negligence was the proximate cause of 
Respondents' damages. Respondents' assumption is faulty. The jurors repeatedly determined that 
the actions of Appellant were not a proximate cause of Respondents' injuries. The jurors 
appohioned fault as they were instructed to do in the special verdict form. There is no reason to 
believe that by answering Question 10 of the Special Verdict ~ o r m ,  that the jurors was making any 
determination with respect to negligence. In fact, the word "fault" is not used in the instructions for 
negligence and proximate cause. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words 
"ordinary care" mean the care a reasonable careful person would use under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus 
consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would 
do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
When I use the expression "proximate cause", I mean a cause that, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It 
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing 
about the injury, loss or damage. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial 
factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause 
of the injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
Based on the language used in the Final Instructions, Negligence without proximate cause 
does not translate into fault. A jury verdict which does not violate Idaho law should not be cast 
aside so lightly. Such a result would undermine the principle of the finality of trials. If at all 
possible, the jury's verdict should be upheld. 
Appellant therefore requests that this Court find that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent 
and reverse the District Court's decision granting Respondent's motion for new trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts presented and the record on appeal, this Court should reverse the 
District Court's rulings on (1) Appellant's motion for summary judgment and (2) Respondents' 
motion for new trial. 
The District Court misinterpreted case law and statutes in finding that owners of 
implements of husbandry are subject to imputed liability under LC. 5 49-2417. The District 
Court failed to properly analyze I.C. $ 9  49-902(1) and (3); 49-903 and 49-916, in finding that 
implements of husbandry are required to have the lighting requirements of I.C. 3 49-916 at all 
times. The District Court inappropriately relied upon evidence that was not in the record in 
finding that sufficient evidence existed for Respondents' negligent entrustment claim. This 
Court should therefore reverse the District Court's rulings on these matters. 
The jury's verdict could be interpreted to be consistent in the specific interrogatories. 
The District Court improperly cast aside the jury's findings and granted a new trial. This Court 
should reverse the District Court's order granting a new trial. 
Appellant also requests that it be reimbursed its costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 9 ~  day of November 2008. 
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